In this article, we present a new perspective on how to combine inquiry-based, problem-oriented learning with practices in the Humanities. Our particular interest is how the initial phase of findin...

Our concepts of the world come from our common activities in the world. Without coastal fishing, or seafaring, in boats too large for their crews to draw them ashore, there is no place for the concept of a harbour. And without reindeer herding, there will be no concept of JASSA. That is one point. The other is this: without some of the coastal fisherman's skill and local knowledge, you will not be able to recognize a natural harbour when you see (...) one. And without the reindeer herder's skill, you will not be able to recognize a JASSA when you see one. To put it all rather bluntly. Though there is more of both work and experience behind the first part of this article, about the world of coastal fishing, most of my academic friends have found the latter part, about the concept JASSA, the better and more readable. Can it be that the better teacher is the one who has just learnt the lesson himself? (shrink)

Researchers from diverse disciplines, including organismal and cellular physiology, sports science, human nutrition, evolution and ecology, have sought to understand the causes and consequences of the surprising variation in metabolic rate found among and within individual animals of the same species. Research in this area has been hampered by differences in approach, terminology and methodology, and the context in which measurements are made. Recent advances provide important opportunities to identify and address the key questions in the field. By bringing together (...) researchers from different areas of biology and biomedicine, we describe and evaluate these developments and the insights they could yield, highlighting the need for more standardisation across disciplines. We conclude with a list of important questions that can now be addressed by developing a common conceptual and methodological toolkit for studies on metabolic variation in animals. (shrink)

It appears that consciousness science is progressing soundly, in particular in its search for the neural correlates of consciousness. There are two main approaches to this search, one is content-based (focusing on the contrast between conscious perception of, e.g., faces vs. houses), the other is state-based (focusing on overall conscious states, e.g., the contrast between dreamless sleep vs. the awake state). Methodological and conceptual considerations of a number of concrete studies show that both approaches are problematic: the content-based approach seems (...) to set aside crucial aspects of consciousness; and the state-based approach seems over-inclusive in a way that is hard to rectify without losing sight of the crucial conscious-unconscious contrast. Consequently, the search for the neural correlates of consciousness is in need of new experimental paradigms. (shrink)

The origins of landscape are usually explained in two complementary ways: on the one hand, landscape is initially related to the artistic genre of the same name, i.e. to the painted landscape; on the other hand, and much more recently, it corresponds to landscape experienced by someone, to the mental representa-tion of a piece of nature. This article is based on a third hypothesis: according to him landscape is, at least partly, the result of a series of modern technologies. The (...) modern window, cartography, central perspective and various other human inventions have made it possible to forge a landscape image of the world. Fram-ing a glimpse of nature through the gaze is a cultural fact, mediated by scopic devices, and not a capacity that human beings possess a priori. (shrink)

Biological evolution provides a creative fount of complex and subtle adaptations, often surprising the scientists who discover them. However, because evolution is an algorithmic process that transcends the substrate in which it occurs, evolution’s creativity is not limited to nature. Indeed, many researchers in the field of digital evolution have observed their evolving algorithms and organisms subverting their intentions, exposing unrecognized bugs in their code, producing unexpected adaptations, or exhibiting outcomes uncannily convergent with ones in nature. Such stories routinely reveal (...) creativity by evolution in these digital worlds, but they rarely fit into the standard scientific narrative. Instead they are often treated as mere obstacles to be overcome, rather than results that warrant study in their own right. The stories themselves are traded among researchers through oral tradition, but that mode of information transmission is inefficient and prone to error and outright loss. Moreover, the fact that these stories tend to be shared only among practitioners means that many natural scientists do not realize how interesting and lifelike digital organisms are and how natural their evolution can be. To our knowledge, no collection of such anecdotes has been published before. This paper is the crowd-sourced product of researchers in the fields of artificial life and evolutionary computation who have provided first-hand accounts of such cases. It thus serves as a written, fact-checked collection of scientifically important and even entertaining stories. In doing so we also present here substantial evidence that the existence and importance of evolutionary surprises extends beyond the natural world, and may indeed be a universal property of all complex evolving systems. (shrink)

The present study had two major aims: first, to examine the construct validity of the Finnish 58-item Corporate Ethical Virtues scale (CEV; Kaptein in J Org Behav 29:923–947, 2008) and second, to examine whether the associations between managers’ perceptions of ethical organisational culture and their occupational well-being (emotional exhaustion and work engagement) are indirectly linked by ethical strain, i.e. the tension which arises from the difference in the ethical values of the individual and the organisation he or she works for. (...) The sample consisted of 902 managers from different organisations, in middle and upper management levels, aged 25–68 years. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) provided support to the hypothesised eight-factor structure of the CEV scale; i.e. the scale contained the factors of clarity, congruency of supervisors, congruency of senior management, feasibility, supportability, transparency, discussability and sanctionability. In addition, it emerged from the CFAs that the high intercorrelations of these factors can be explained by the second-order factor of ethical culture. The managers’ perceptions of the ethical culture prevailing in their organisations were associated with their occupational well-being both directly (high-work engagement) and indirectly via a low level of ethical strain (low-emotional exhaustion). Thus, the findings indicated that the ethical culture of organisations plays a major role in managers’ occupational well-being. (shrink)

The aims of this study were to investigate what kinds of personal work goals managers have and whether ethical organisational culture is related to these goals. The sample consisted of 811 Finnish managers from different organisations, in middle and upper management levels, aged 25–68 years. Eight work-related goal content categories were found based on the managers self-reported goals: (1) organisational goals (35.4 %), (2) competence goals (26.1 %), (3) well-being goals (12.1 %), (4) career-ending goals (7.3 %), (5) progression goals (...) (6.8 %), (6) prestige/influence goals (4.2 %), (7) job change goals (4.2 %) and (8) employment contract goals (3.9 %). Ethical organisational culture operated as a context for personal goal setting: Those managers who evaluated their organisational culture as more ethical were more likely to report organisational goals (e.g. goals toward the success or performance of the organisation). However, if managers gave lower ratings regarding ethical culture, then they named job change and career-ending goals in more cases. Therefore, investing into ethical virtues of the organisational culture can promote managers’ personal work goals, which also benefit the organisation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 65-70 [Access article in PDF] Top-Down and Bottom-Up in Delusion Formation Jakob Hohwy Keywords delusions, top-down, bottom-up, predictive coding Some delusions may arise as responses to unusual experiences (Davies et al. 2001; Maher 1974;). The implication is that delusion formation in some cases involves some kind of bottom-up mechanism—roughly, from perception to belief. Delusion formation may also involve some kind of top-down (...) mechanism. This could be in the shape of a patient's flawed background beliefs, or biases, which somehow modulate perception or ensure delusional interpretations of experience. There is little agreement about what kind of mechanism is primary in delusion formation, or, indeed, what the particular mechanisms and their neural substrates might be.In the evaluation of top-down and bottom-up mechanisms in delusion formation, a number of conceptual questions should be addressed (Davies and Coltheart 2000). For example, if there is an experiential component, why is a hypothesis with a delusional explanation of the unusual experience seen as relevant? Why do the subjects come to believe it tenaciously? How come some unusual experiences do not develop into delusions?A number of empirical findings also need to be taken into account: for example, the damage to the autonomic system in Capgras delusion (Ellis et al. 1997), the decreased ability for fast error correction in schizophrenia (Frith and Done 1989), modulation of activity in parietal cortex in delusions of alien control and other passivity experiences (Blakemore, Oakley, and Frith 2003), and also in schizophrenia, the increased sensitivity to self-produced stimuli, such as tickling oneself (Blakemore et al. 2000) and the sound of one's own voice (Ford et al. 2001).Theory choice can also be guided by philosophical doctrines about, for example, the nature of belief, the constitutive role of rationality, and intersubjectivity and the nature of judgements about the external world. It is natural, however, to let beliefs about philosophical doctrine be secondary to empirical findings and conceptual issues.The distinction between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms is particularly sharp in John Campbell's (2001) account of delusions and in Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie's (2004) discussion of Campbell. In this discussion, top-down approaches are associated with the general philosophical doctrine of rationalism, and bottom-up approaches with the philosophical doctrine of empiricism. Campbell's account is top-down because he posits delusional framework beliefs that arise directly as a result of brain damage or malfunction, and that work in some top-down fashion on the interpretation of experience. Bayne [End Page 65] and Pacherie convincingly defend empiricism against Campbell's rationalist account. Among their many other objections, they briefly puzzle about how a delusional framework belief (e.g., that one's spouse is an impostor) in a top-down fashion could cause the damage to the autonomic system seen in the Capgras and Cotard delusions (2004, 1). I think this is a very important objection because skin conductance data are part of the evidence for the bottom-up hypothesis concerning the Capgras delusion. We could add to this, for example, that it is mysterious how belief in a top-down fashion could cause people with schizophrenia to be worse at fast error correction than normal controls, to be better at tickling themselves than normal controls, and to have an increased response to the sound of their own voice.On the other hand, although the skin conductance response (SCR) evidence suggests a bottom-up approach to the Capgras delusion, it does not explain the character of the subjective experience that is hypothesized to give rise to the delusional belief: reduced SCR is not part of the experience itself (thanks to Ian Gold for discussion of this). Something more is required to give a full account of the type of experience that gives rise to the delusion. Further, as they stand, most bottom-up accounts are unable to account for why reality testing fails for beliefs based on these experiences.Neither rationalism nor empiricism on their own seem able to address the conceptual questions while paying... (shrink)

In this paper, we sketch a programme for AI-driven social theory. We begin by defining what we mean by artificial intelligence (AI) in this context. We then lay out our specification for how AI-based models can draw on the growing availability of digital data to help test the validity of different social theories based on their predictive power. In doing so, we use the work of Randall Collins and his state breakdown model to exemplify that, already today, AI-based models can (...) help synthesise knowledge from a variety of sources, reason about the world, and apply what is known across a wide range of problems in a systematic way. However, we also find that AI-driven social theory remains subject to a range of practical, technical, and epistemological limitations. Most critically, existing AI-systems lack three essential capabilities needed to advance social theory in ways that are cumulative, holistic, open-ended, and purposeful. These are (1) semanticisation, i.e., the ability to develop and operationalize verbal concepts to represent machine-manipulable knowledge; (2) transferability, i.e., the ability to transfer what has been learned in one context to another; and (3) generativity, i.e., the ability to independently create and improve on concepts and models. We argue that if the gaps identified here are addressed by further research, there is no reason why, in the future, the most advanced programme in social theory should not be led by AI-driven cumulative advances. (shrink)

For \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${f,g\in\omega^\omega}$$\end{document} let \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\forall_{f,g}}$$\end{document} be the minimal number of uniform g-splitting trees needed to cover the uniform f-splitting tree, i.e., for every branch ν of the f-tree, one of the g-trees contains ν. Let \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\exists_{f,g}}$$\end{document} be the dual notion: For every branch ν, one of the g-trees guesses ν(m) infinitely often. We show that (...) it is consistent that \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${c^\exists_{f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon}{=}c^\forall_{f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon}{=}\kappa_\e psilon}$$\end{document} for continuum many pairwise different cardinals \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\kappa_\epsilon}$$\end{document} and suitable pairs \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${(f_\epsilon,g_\epsilon)}$$\end{document}. For the proof we introduce a new mixed-limit creature forcing construction. (shrink)

Jennifer Lackey has recently presented a new and lucid analysis of the notion ofjustified group belief, i.e. a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a group to justifiedly believe some proposition. In this paper, however, I argue that theanalysansshe proposes is too narrow: one of the conditions she takes to be necessary for justified group belief is not necessary. To substantiate this claim, I present a potential counterexample to Lackey's analysis where a group knows and thus justifiedly (...) believes some proposition but there is no single group member who actually believes that proposition. I close by defending the example against the objection that the group in question does notknowbut is at mostin a positionto know the target proposition. (shrink)

For f, g $ \in \omega ^\omega $ let $c_{f,g}^\forall $ be the minimal number of uniform g-splitting trees (or: Slaloms) to cover the uniform f-splitting tree, i.e., for every branch v of the f-tree, one of the g-trees contains v. $c_{f,g}^\exists $ is the dual notion: For every branch v, one of the g-trees guesses v(m) infinitely often. It is consistent that $c_{f \in ,g \in }^\exists = c_{f \in ,g \in }^\forall = k_ \in $ for N₁ many (...) pairwise different cardinals $k_ \in $ and suitable pairs $(f_{ \in ,g \in } ).$ For the proof we use creatures with sufficient bigness and halving. We show that the lim-inf creature forcing satisfies fusion and pure decision. We introduce decisiveness and use it to construct a variant of the countable support iteration of such forcings, which still satisfies fusion and pure decision. (shrink)

Organisations that design and deploy artificial intelligence (AI) systems increasingly commit themselves to high-level, ethical principles. However, there still exists a gap between principles and practices in AI ethics. One major obstacle organisations face when attempting to operationalise AI Ethics is the lack of a well-defined material scope. Put differently, the question to which systems and processes AI ethics principles ought to apply remains unanswered. Of course, there exists no universally accepted definition of AI, and different systems pose different ethical (...) challenges. Nevertheless, pragmatic problem-solving demands that things should be sorted so that their grouping will promote successful actions for some specific end. In this article, we review and compare previous attempts to classify AI systems for the purpose of implementing AI governance in practice. We find that attempts to classify AI systems proposed in previous literature use one of three mental models: _the Switch_, i.e., a binary approach according to which systems either are or are not considered AI systems depending on their characteristics; _the Ladder_, i.e., a risk-based approach that classifies systems according to the ethical risks they pose; and _the Matrix_, i.e., a multi-dimensional classification of systems that take various aspects into account, such as context, input data, and decision-model. Each of these models for classifying AI systems comes with its own set of strengths and weaknesses. By conceptualising different ways of classifying AI systems into simple mental models, we hope to provide organisations that design, deploy, or regulate AI systems with the vocabulary needed to demarcate the material scope of their AI governance frameworks. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

Resumo: No capítulo 5 do Livro III De anima (430a10-19) Aristóteles distingue entre o νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus agens (intelecto agente), e νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), chamado pelos Latinos intellectus passivus, ou seja, intellectus possibilis (intelecto possível), termos técnicos e filosóficos mais comuns. O capítulo 5 é de grande importância não só para a filosofia antiga e para os comentadores das obras de Aristóteles, como os comentários de Teofrasto, de Alexander de Afrodisias, de Simplício e Themístius (...) entre outros, mas também para a filosofia do mundo árabe e da Europa latina. Sabe-se que Aristóteles não escreveu um tratado próprio sobre o intelecto, embora possam ser encontradas várias observações acerca do intelecto em suas obras. Os tratados do Intelecto começam com Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicena e sobretudo Averróis, e se refletem, num sentido crítico e afirmativo, (nos debates) dos tratados latinos, por exemplo, nos tratados de Alberto Magno, de Tomás de Aquino, de Sigério de Brabant entre outros. Este artigo apresenta observações preliminares e preparatórias ao projeto de traduções bilíngue (Latim-Português) dos tratados medievais sobre o intelecto ‘Teorias do Intelecto na Idade Média’ que está em desenvovlimento no Centro Internacional de Estudos Medievais da UFU. Palavras-chaves: Unidade do intelecto; Imaginação; Intencionalidade; Luz intelectual e cognição. Theories of the Intellect in the Latin Middle Ages. De anima III, cap. 5 of Aristotle and his Medieval Tradition Abstract: In the chapter 5 of the III. Book of De anima (430a10-19) Aristotle distinguishes between the νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós) called by the Latins intellectus agens (agent intellect) and the νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós) called by the Latins intellectus passivus, or intellectus possibilis (possible intellect), most common technical and philosophical terms. The chapter 5 is of great importance not only to ancient philosophy and to the commentators of Aristotle’s works such as the commentaries of Theophrastus, Alexander of Aphrodisias, of Simplicius, and Themistius among others, but also to the philosophy of the Arabic World and the Latin Europe. One knows well that Aristotle does not have written a proper treatise on intellect; although there are several observations about the intellect in his works. Separate treatises begin with Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and especially Averroes, which Latin treatises as of Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Siger of Brabant among others reflect in a critical as well as an affirmative sense. This article can be read as preliminary and preparatory observations to a bilingual (Latin-Portuguese) translation project of treatises corresponding to ‘Theories of Intellect in the Middle Ages’ which is ongoing at the International Center for Medieval Studies at UFU. Key-words: Unity of the Intellect; Imagination; Intentionality; Intellectual Light; and Cognition. Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter. De anima III, 5 des Aristoteles und seine mittelalterliche Tradition Zusammenfassung: Im 5. Kapitel des III. Buchs von De anima (430a10-19) unterscheidet Aristoteles zwischen dem νοῦς ποιητικός (nous poietikós), von den Lateinern intellectus agens (tätiger Intellekt) genannt und dem νοῦς παθητικός (nous pathetikós), von den Lateinern intellectus passivus oder auch intellectus possibilis (möglicher Intellekt) genannt, gemeinhin bekannte technische und philosophische Begriffe. Dieses 5. Kapitel ist von grösster Bedeutung nicht nur für die antike Philosophie und die Kommentatoren der Werke des Aristoteles wie die Kommentare des Theophrastus, des Alexander von Aphrodisias, Simplicius und Themistius unter anderen, sondern auch für die Philosophie der arabischen Welt und des lateinischen Europas. Bekanntlich hat Aristoteles keinen eigenen Traktat über den Intellekt geschrieben, obgleich sich viele Beobachtungen zum Intellekt in seinem Werk antreffen. Selbständige Traktate über den Intellekt beginnen mit Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Avicenna und besonders Averroes, die sich in den lateinischen Traktaten, z.B. des Albertus Magnus, Thomas von Aquin, Siger von Brabant und anderen zustimmend wie kritisch widerspiegeln. Dieser Artikel kann als vorläufige und vorbereitende Bemerkungen zu einem zweisprachigen (lateinisch-portugiesischen) Übersetzungsprojekt von Texten gelesen werden, welche „Theorien des Intellekts im Lateinischen Mittelalter“ betreffen. Dieses Projekt ist am Internationalen Zentrum für Mittelalterstudien der UFU in Arbeit genommen worden. Schlüsselwörter: Verstand; Vernunft; Intentionalität; Anschauung und Erkenntnis. Data de registro: 12/03/2020 Data de aceite: 21/10/2020. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of effective Axiom A and use it to show that some popular tree forcings are Suslin+. We introduce transitive nep and present a simplified version of Shelah’s “preserving a little implies preserving much”: If I is a Suslin ccc ideal (e.g. Lebesgue-null or meager) and P is a transitive nep forcing (e.g. P is Suslin+) and P does not make any I-positive Borel set small, then P does not make any I-positive set small.

The so-called Alan Author Effect is a surprising phenomenon in Bayesian Confirmation Theory. It occurs when a piece of evidence e confirms the conjunction of two hypotheses h1∧h2 but at the same time disconfirms each hypothesis h1 and h2 individually. In this paper, I present a new and prima facie stronger version of this effect where additionally, the evidence e confirms the conjunction of the negated hypotheses ¬h1∧¬h2. I say ‘prima facie’ because it can be shown that this seemingly stronger (...) effect and the original effect are actually coextensional. I use this insight to formulate a new sufficient (and also necessary) condition for the two equivalent effects. I also examine how likely the two effects are to occur with the help of Monte Carlo simulation methods. (shrink)

Este texto contrasta o entendimento comum do "perspectivismo de Nietzsche" com o seu uso da palavra "Perspektive" e termos semelhantes. As primeiras seções proporcionam uma breve pesquisa do desenvolvimento dos diversos significados através da carreira de Nietzsche e a influência de Gustav Teichmüller. As seções subsequentes revelam alguns problemas de leituras comuns do perspectivismo, como a teoria do conhecimento de Nietzsche. Discutindo os assuntos de falsificação, objetividade e autorreferência, as seções remanescentes levam à conclusão que o perspectivismo não deve ser (...) entendido como a doutrina epistemológica de Nietzsche, mas como algo que não o deixa criar tal doutrina.This paper contrasts common understandings of "Nietzsche's perspectivism" with his use of the word "Perspektive" and related wordforms. The first sections provide a brief survey of the development of different meanings throughout Nietzsche's career and the influence of Gustav Teichmüller. The next sections unfold some problems of common readings of perspectivism as Nietzsche's theory of knowledge. Discussing the issues of falsification, objectivity and self-reference, the remaining sections lead to the conclusion that perspectivsm should not be understood as Nietzsche's doctrine of epistemology but rather as what keeps him from providing such a doctrine. (shrink)

While political philosophers often assume that we need to imagine a better future in order to hope for it, philosophers of hope doubt that hope and imagination are constitutively intertwined. In order to solve this puzzle, the article introduces a particular kind of hope in which we imaginatively inhabit a desired future. Combining insights from the philosophy of hope and of imagination, I unpack what imaginative hope is and why it is particularly significant in political contexts. I contend that in (...) cases where we pursue a goal the realization of which requires collective action over a long time-scale (as it is paradigmatically the case in politics), the imagination has the potential to bolster the practical value of hope, i.e., its power to guide and sustain our agency. (shrink)

It has been widely discussed whether the existence of other universes than the known universe is a purely metaphysical consideration. This paper argues to the contrary that the existence of other universes is a meaningful hypothesis, which can be tested based on observable data. The paper applies the perspective of observer bias as an approach for assigning probabilities to the mutually excluding hypotheses of universe vs. multiverse, i.e., whether the known universe is the only universe, or just one universe in (...) an ensemble of universes, a so-called multiverse. The basic idea of the paper relies on the following consideration. In a multiverse, the vast majority of observers would live in universes that are more life friendly. Thus, conditional on there being a multiverse, we should expect to find ourselves in a universe with values of the fundamental parameters that provide particularly fertile grounds for life. In contrast, if there is only a single universe, it may well be the case that there is still a few observers even if the parameters are far from ideal for life, and in that case, those observers will find values of the parameters that are not ideal for intelligent life. It may well be the case that, among all parameter configurations that allow life at least somewhere, those that are not ideal for life far outnumber those that are ideal for life. Based on this elementary consideration, the paper proceeds to propose a quantitative framework to determine probabilities for either hypothesis. In particular, it is described how a future ab initio determination of some of the factors in the Drake equation may be used to infer which one of the two hypotheses is the more likely. A quantitative approach to this end is proposed. Expressing these factors of the Drake equation in the context of the two hypotheses, a general likelihood approach is first described. Then, to support intuition, example computations are provided, illustrating how an actual hypothesis test would work in practice. (shrink)

In den letzten 25 Jahren hat das chinesische Recht eine beeindruckende Entwicklung erfahren. In zunehmendem Maße wird es Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Untersuchungen, und in Deutschland erscheinen in immer größerer Zahl Publikationen, die das chinesische Recht für die Rechtsvergleichung erschließen oder es rechtsvergleichend mit anderen Rechtsordnungen erörtern. In der neuen Schriftenreihe Schriften zum chinesischen Recht, die im Auftrag der Deutsch-Chinesischen Juristenvereinigung von Professor Dr. Uwe Blaurock, Freiburg, Professor Dr. Ulrich Manthe, Passau, Dr. Knut B. Pißler, Hamburg, und Professorin Dr. Christiane Wendehorst, Göttingen, (...) herausgegeben wird, sollen in erster Linie Monographien, wie etwa herausragende Dissertationen oder Habilitationsschriften erscheinen, darüber hinaus aber auch Tagungsbände sowie kommentierte Übersetzungen wichtiger chinesischer Gesetze oder zweisprachige Gesetzessammlungen. Es soll hiermit der wissenschaftliche Gedankenaustausch mit China gefördert und für rechtsvergleichend arbeitende Juristen eine Publikationsplattform geschaffen werden. Ein besonderer Gesichtspunkt ist dabei auch der Praxisbezug der veröffentlichten Werke. Die Herausgeber hoffen, dass die Schriften zum chinesischen Recht künftig einen wesentlichen Bestandteil des rechtlichen Dialogs zwischen Deutschland und China bilden werden und wünschen ihnen eine wohlwollende Aufnahme in der juristischen Öffentlichkeit. (shrink)

In an attempt to demonstrate that local hidden variables are mathematically possible, Pitowsky constructed “spin- functions” and later “Kolmogorovian models”, which employs a nonstandard notion of probability. We describe Pitowsky’s analysis and argue that his notion of hidden variables is in fact just super-determinism. Pitowsky’s first construction uses the Continuum Hypothesis. Farah and Magidor took this as an indication that at some stage physics might give arguments for or against adopting specific new axioms of set theory. We would rather argue (...) that it supports the opposing view, i.e., the widespread intuition “if you need a non-measurable function, it is physically irrelevant”. (shrink)

The topic of this article is religious materiality in a Finnish, Lutheran setting. Reflecting on the altar cross of the Luther Church Helsinki – and more specifically the elevated role the cross played in the re-opening of the church in 2016 – the article supports the argument of recent scholars that Protestant engagement with materiality is not unambiguously negative but rather ambivalent. Using James Bielo’s concept of “legitimizing frames” – i.e. boundaries or landmarks within which Protestants feel safe enough to (...) deal with things and objects – the article suggests a so-called heritagization frame. Objects or things used within such a frame induce in people a sense of past events and experiences – preferably events in which God has made himself known in this world. This, in turn, enables people’s engagement with the objects. (shrink)

Wenn eine Person unter einer tödlichen Krankheit leidet und nicht über die Ressourcen für eine medizinische Behandlung verfügt, sind wir normalerweise dazu verpflichtet, ihr die notwendigen Ressourcen bereitzustellen. Wären wir aber in einem biotechnischen Zukunftsszenario, in dem die menschliche Lebensspanne durch Eingriffe in den Alterungsprozess erhöht werden kann, auch dazu verpflichtet, anderen Personen die notwendigen Ressourcen für solche Maßnahmen bereitzustellen? John Harris hat argumentiert, dass wir zu solch einer direkten biotechnischen Lebensverlängerung verpflichtet wären, da ein Leben zu verlängern das Gleiche (...) sei, wie ein Leben zu retten. Im vorliegenden Aufsatz wird gezeigt, dass Harris’ Argument nicht schlüssig ist, da entgegen seiner Prämisse ein begrifflicher Unterschied zwischen der Rettung und der Verlängerung eines Lebens besteht. Auf Grundlage von Harris’ zurückgewiesenem Argument werden dann aber zwei alternative Argumente für eine (prima facie) Pflicht zur direkten Lebensverlängerung konstruiert. Das erste Argument basiert auf der Überlegung, dass durch eine direkte biotechnische Lebensverlängerung trotz des begrifflichen Unterschieds mit einer substanziellen Wahrscheinlichkeit Leben gerettet werden würden. Das zweite Argument besagt, dass trotz deskriptiver Unterschiede eine moralische Äquivalenz zwischen der Rettung und der Verlängerung eines Lebens besteht, sofern durch die bloße Lebensverlängerung das Leben um die gleiche Dauer und Qualität verlängert wird wie durch die Lebensrettung. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- When a person suffers from a deadly disease and is lacking the resources for a medical treatment, we are normally obliged to provide the necessary resources. But would we also be morally obliged to provide the resources for an extension of someone’s lifespan through anti-aging treatments which might be developed due to biotechnological progress? John Harris has argued that there would be an obligation to such a direct biotechnical life extension because extending a life is the same as saving a life. In the present paper, it will be shown that Harris’ argument is not sound since, contrary to his premise, there is a conceptual difference between extending and saving a life. On the basis of Harris’ rejected argument, though, two alternative arguments for a (prima facie) obligation to direct biotechnical life extension will be developed. The first argument is based on the idea that, despite the conceptual difference, one saves someone’s life with a substantial probability when extending it by direct biotechnical means. In the second argument, it will be argued that there is a moral equivalence between extending and saving someone’s life despite the descriptive differences as far as the additional lifetime has the same duration and quality in both cases. (shrink)

Francesco Praolini has recently put pressure on the view that justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction. Based on what he calls ‘the hybrid paradox,’ he argues that accepting the principle of conjunction closure for justified believability, quite surprisingly, entails that one must also accept the principle of factivity for justified believability, i.e. that there are no propositions that are justifiably believable and false at the same time. But proponents of conjunction closure can do without factivity, as I argue in (...) this short note. A less demanding principle is available. (shrink)

The normative character of meaning creates deep problems for the attempt to give a reductive explanation of the constitution of meaning. I identify and critically examine an increasingly popular Carnap-style position, which I call Internalized Meaning Factualism (versions of which I argue are defended by, e.g., Robert Brandom, Paul Horwich and Huw Price), that promises to solve the problems. According to this position, the problem of meaning can be solved by prohibiting an external perspective on meaning constituting properties. The idea (...) is that if we stick to a perspective on meaning that is internal to meaning discourse, then we can preserve the normativity of meaning and yet locate meaning in the natural world. I develop a generic motivation for this position, but argue that, since this motivation is consistent with the Ramsey–Carnap–Lewis–Jackson reductionist strategy, internalized meaning factualism is unstable. The problems about the normativity of meaning can therefore not be sidestepped in this way. (shrink)

This paper inquires the ways in which paper folding constitutes a mathematical practice and may prompt a mathematical culture. To do this, we first present and investigate the common mathematical activities shared by this culture, i.e. we present mathematical paper folding as a material reasoning practice. We show that the patterns of mathematical activity observed in mathematical paper folding are, at least since the end of the nineteenth century, sufficiently stable to be considered as a practice. Moreover, we will argue (...) that this practice is material. The permitted inferential actions when reasoning by folding are controlled by the physical realities of paper-like material, whilst claims to generality of some reasoning operations are supported by arguments from other mathematical idioms. The controlling structure provided by this material side of the practice is tight enough to allow for non-textual shared standards of argument and wide enough to provide sufficiently many problems for a practice to form. The upshot is that mathematical paper folding is a non-propositional and non-diagrammatic reasoning practice that adds to our understanding of the multi-faceted nature of the epistemic force of mathematical proof. We then draw on what we have learned from our contemplations about paper folding to highlight some lessons about what a study of mathematical cultures entails. (shrink)

A teoria convergente da verdade de Peirce é uma abordagem intuitiva e razoável da verdade. No seu sentido mais geral, vincula a verdade aos resultados da investigação. De acordo com a máxima pragmática, Peirce percebeu que as consequências práticas de afirmações verdadeiras são de trazer investigações à fruição e resolver opinião. No entanto, a teoria da verdade de Peirce é muitas vezes difamada e mal-entendida. Argumenta-se, aqui, que uma vez que se entende que a teoria convergente é uma inferência e (...) generalização oriunda do notável teorema matemático conhecido como a Lei dos Grandes Números, e como esse teorema fornece certeza matemática à indução como o cerne do método científico, muitos dos problemas desaparecem. Parte do mal-entendido também se deve ao fato que Peirce tinha três sentidos distintos de convergência, os quais muitos comentadores confundem ou interpretam erroneamente. Com esse entendimento, será mostrado que ao contrário das análises de Cheryl Misak e Christopher Hookway, Peirce argumenta que investigação persistente por bons métodos não é apenas um ideal regulador para atingir a verdade – uma esperança intelectual – mas uma possibilidade comprovada matematicamente que já resultou em verdades estabelecidas. (shrink)

In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual rankings. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do—epistemologically—to mitigate it. In a recent paper, Jönsson and Sjödahl in [Episteme 14:499–517, 2017], argue that the epistemic problem (...) can be fruitfully addressed by way of a novel statistical method that changes the products of biased behaviour, i.e. the rankings themselves, rather than the biased persons. Jönsson and Sjödahl’s pioneering proposal is a both a welcome addition to the literature on implicit bias, due the problems with existing implicit bias interventions [see e.g. Lai et al. in J Exp Psychol Gen 143:1765–1785; J Exp Psychol Gen 145:1001–1016, 2014; 2016; Forscher et al. in J Person Soc Psychol 117:522–559, 2019] but also to the literature on prejudice more generally, where many proposed prejudice-reduction strategies enjoy less than adequate empirical support [Paluck and Green in Ann Rev Psychol 60:339–367, 2009]. Their proposal, however, needs supplementation in two ways: the circumstances that must hold in order for it to work needs to be refined, and their claim that it works as intended in these circumstances needs to be validated. We argue that four of Jönsson and Sjödahl’s method’s presumed presuppositions can be weakened, but needs to be supplemented by two additional assumptions, overlooked by Jönsson and Sjödahl. Moreover, we demonstrate that the method does work as intended by way of a statistical simulation. (shrink)

Hertz, J. H. Saadya gaon.--Altmann, A. Saadya's theory of revelation.--Herzog, D. The polemic treatise against Saadya.--Krauss, S. Saadya's Tafsir of the seventy hapax legomena explained and continued.--Leveen, J. Saadya's lost commentary on Leviticus.--Markon, I. explained by Saadya and his successors.--Marmorstein, A. The doctrine of redemption in Saadya's theological system.--Mittwoch, E. An unknown fragment by Gaon Saadya.--Rabin, C. Saadya gaon's Hebrew prose style.--Rawidowicz, S. Saadya's purification of the idea of God.-- Robertson, E. The relationship of the Arabic translation of the Samaritan (...) Pentateuch to that of Saadya.--Rosenthal, E. I. J. Saadya's exegesis of the Book of Job.--Stein, S. Saadya's Piyyuṭ of the alphabet.--Weis, P. R. The anti-Ḳaraite tendency of R. Saadya gaon's Arabic version of the Pentateuch.--Wieder, N. Fourteen new Genizah-fragments of Saadya's Siddur together with a reproduction of a missing part. (shrink)

Cephalopods are extraordinary molluscs equipped with vertebrate‐like intelligence and a unique buoyancy system for locomotion. A growing body of evidence from the fossil record, embryology and Bayesian molecular divergence estimations provides a comprehensive picture of their origins and evolution. Cephalopods evolved during the Cambrian (∼530 Ma) from a monoplacophoran‐like mollusc in which the conical, external shell was modified into a chambered buoyancy apparatus. During the mid‐Palaeozoic (∼416 Ma) cephalopods diverged into nautiloids and the presently dominant coleoids. Coleoids (i.e. squids, cuttlefish (...) and octopods) internalised their shells and, in the late Palaeozoic (∼276 Ma), diverged into Vampyropoda and the Decabrachia. This shell internalisation appears to be a unique evolutionary event. In contrast, the loss of a mineralised shell has occurred several times in distinct coleoid lineages. The general tendency of shell reduction reflects a trend towards active modes of life and much more complex behaviour. (shrink)

Normative reasons are of constant importance to us as agents trying to navigate through life. For this reason it is natural and vital to ask philosophical questions about reasons and the normative realm. This thesis explores various issues concerning reasons and normativity. The thesis consists of five free-standingpapers and an extended introduction. The aim of the extended introduction is not merely to situate the papers within a wider philosophical context but also to provide an overview of some of the central (...) research questions concerning reasons and normativity. The introduction is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 introduces and outlines the dissertation. Chapter 2 concerns the issue of what a reason is and what different types of reasons there are, such as pro tanto reasons and overall reasons. Chapter 3 discusses the frequently employed weighing metaphor, i.e. that reasons have a certain weight and can be weighed against the weight of other reasons. Chapter 4 covers how reasons relate to other normative notions such as ought, value, and obligation. For example, it discusses whether it is the case that for something to be valuable just is for there to be reasons to favor it. Chapter 5 concludes the introduction by briefly exploring how it all relates.The thesis can be said to be embedded in a recent research trend within philosophy of normativity that has a distinguished focus on reasons.The five papers deal with various issues concerning reasons and normativity. Paper I argues for a novel and theoretically parsimonious way to understand background conditions for values and reasons. Paper II explores an interpretation of the distinction between subjectivism and objectivism about reasons and value so as to accommodate that the distinction does not commit either party to certain first order claims about what reasons there are or what makes objects valuable. Paper III discusses the dictum ‘ought implies can’and how to properly interpret the ‘can’. Paper IV defends principles according to which what we ought and have reasons to do transmit from ends to the necessary means of that action. Paper V analyzes how the Fitting Attitudes analysis of value should best understand degrees of value. (shrink)

The ethics of blame includes conditions determining whether an instance of blame is permissible. One generally recognised condition is that blame should be proportionate. If it is not proportionate, that speaks against its permissibility. All the same, what exactly amounts to proportionate blame is currently under-theorised. In this paper, we aim to amend this. More precisely, we distinguish between private and overt blame and highlight some of their differences – e.g., that they aggregate differently. Then, we develop an account of (...) proportional blame and draw out some practical implications of our account. (shrink)

Ein prominenter Einwand gegen Kohärenztheorien der Rechtfertigung lautet, dass der zugrunde liegende Begriff der Kohärenz vage ist. In diesem Buch geben wir einen Überblick über die neuere Forschung im Bereich probabilistischer Kohärenzmaße, die den Begriff der Kohärenz mit Hilfe der Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie zu präzisieren versuchen. Im ersten Teil des Buches werden sämtliche Kohärenzmaße sowie ihre jeweiligen Vor- und Nachteile vorgestellt. Dabei werden sowohl Adäquatheitsbedingungen als auch Testfälle für Kohärenzmaße berücksichtigt. Im zweiten Teil stehen dann mögliche Anwendungen von Kohärenzmaßen im Bereich der (...) Kohärenztheorie der Rechtfertigung im Mittelpunkt. Insbesondere die Frage nach der Wahrheits- und Verlässlichkeitsförderlichkeit werden mit Bezug auf die vorgestellten Maße diskutiert. Zudem wird der Zusammenhang zwischen Kohärenz und Konsistenz eingehend beleuchtet. Der letzte Teil des Buches widmet sich dann den Problemen und Einwänden sowohl gegen einzelne Klassen von Maßen als auch gegen das Projekt der probabilistischen Kohärenzmaße insgesamt. Hier werden unter anderem das Problem der Individuierung von Überzeugungen sowie der Zusammenhang zwischen dem Begriff der Kohärenz und dem der Erkärung betrachtet. (shrink)

This study defends the view that Plato’s account of meaning and truth does not depend on strong Platonism. Strong Platonism is based, among other things, on the assumption that basic entities are pure and cannot mix with anything. In a semantic theory, such entities provide stability of reference to single terms and so keep the danger of fluctuating meanings at bay. Unfortunately, strong Platonism pays a heavy price for this stability in that it cannot explain how terms can be combined (...) into sentences and how statements can be true if truth consists in correspondence between the statement and how things really are. The book under review offers an account of a more restricted ontology. By doing so, it... (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) assurance is an umbrella term describing many approaches—such as impact assessment, audit, and certification procedures—used to provide evidence that an AI system is legal, ethical, and technically robust. AI assurance approaches largely focus on two overlapping categories of harms: deployment harms that emerge at, or after, the point of use, and individual harms that directly impact a person as an individual. Current approaches generally overlook upstream collective and societal harms associated with the development of systems, such as (...) resource extraction and processing, exploitative labour practices and energy intensive model training. Thus, the scope of current AI assurance practice is insufficient for ensuring that AI is ethical in a holistic sense, i.e. in ways that are legally permissible, socially acceptable, economically viable and environmentally sustainable. This article addresses this shortcoming by arguing for a broader approach to AI assurance that is sensitive to the full scope of AI development and deployment harms. To do so, the article maps harms related to AI and highlights three examples of harmful practices that occur upstream in the AI supply chain and impact the environment, labour, and data exploitation. It then reviews assurance mechanisms used in adjacent industries to mitigate similar harms, evaluating their strengths, weaknesses, and how effectively they are being applied to AI. Finally, it provides recommendations as to how a broader approach to AI assurance can be implemented to mitigate harms more effectively across the whole AI supply chain. (shrink)